them", 5 the Security Council went on to order the establishment of the International Tribunal for Rwanda for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. 6 In the same paragraph, the Security Council adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 7 and then went on to request the Secretary General to implement Resolution 955 urgently and make arrangements for the functioning of the Tribunal. By contrast, the Tribunal itself appears to have been less direct in its approach to the fact of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This piece seeks to show that acknowledgment of the existence of the genocide has prompted some amount of judicial discomfiture, if not clear contradictions, in the working of the Tribunal. This discomfiture and the occasional distortions in judicial technique that it causes are all the more undesirable since they are unnecessary, a conclusion that I seek to prove through an examination of several judgments as well as interlocutory decisions of the Tribunal. In particular, decisions given by the Tribunal in relation to the doctrine of judicial notice amply illustrate how frequently the Tribunal has been asked to acknowledge the existence of a genocide in Rwanda and how varied and ambiguous its answers have been. The net result seems to have been to throw an unintended shadow of doubt on the most fundamental fact before the Tribunal, that of the genocide itself. 
